The 'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems
The Ethic of Care began as a theory of moral development, but many have accepted it as if it were a normative moral theory, either alone or in conjunction with the Ethic of Justice. This project determines whether or not the Ethic of Care actually can constitute a comprehensive moral theory. I b...
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ndltd-UBC-oai-circle.library.ubc.ca-2429-136832018-01-05T17:36:58Z The 'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems Fisher, Johnna Elizabeth Ann The Ethic of Care began as a theory of moral development, but many have accepted it as if it were a normative moral theory, either alone or in conjunction with the Ethic of Justice. This project determines whether or not the Ethic of Care actually can constitute a comprehensive moral theory. I begin with the history of the development of the Ethic of Care. I then examine the widely-held view that moral relations are freely-chosen contractual agreements occurring between rational equals in order to manage the problem of public competition of interests and to protect individual rights. I suggest that this view of morality, its associated moral theory, the Ethic of Justice, and its criterion of impartiality do not represent the totality of moral experience and they mandate unpalatable outcomes in some private moral situations. As a result, I contend that the impartiality requirement should not be a criterion for judging the adequacy of a theory governing personal (private) moral relations. I suggest a list of appropriate criteria and compare the Ethic of Care with the list in order to determine whether it can act as a theory governing this realm. I argue that the Ethic of Care is a theory of personal morality, that the Ethic of Justice is a theory of impersonal morality, and that the quest for a comprehensive moral theory that accounts for the totality of moral relations must integrate these two perspectives in a way that overcomes the problem of prioritization. Various integration options from the current philosophical literature are explained and rejected before I provide my own account of how the Ethic of Care and the Ethic of Justice can interact, together providing a comprehensive moral theory capable of guiding action for the entire range of moral relations. Arts, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Graduate 2009-10-07 2009-10-07 2001 2001-05 Text Thesis/Dissertation http://hdl.handle.net/2429/13683 eng For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use. 13533941 bytes application/pdf |
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Others
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description |
The Ethic of Care began as a theory of moral development, but many have accepted it as if
it were a normative moral theory, either alone or in conjunction with the Ethic of Justice. This
project determines whether or not the Ethic of Care actually can constitute a comprehensive
moral theory.
I begin with the history of the development of the Ethic of Care. I then examine the
widely-held view that moral relations are freely-chosen contractual agreements occurring between
rational equals in order to manage the problem of public competition of interests and to protect
individual rights. I suggest that this view of morality, its associated moral theory, the Ethic of
Justice, and its criterion of impartiality do not represent the totality of moral experience and they
mandate unpalatable outcomes in some private moral situations.
As a result, I contend that the impartiality requirement should not be a criterion for
judging the adequacy of a theory governing personal (private) moral relations. I suggest a list of
appropriate criteria and compare the Ethic of Care with the list in order to determine whether it
can act as a theory governing this realm. I argue that the Ethic of Care is a theory of personal
morality, that the Ethic of Justice is a theory of impersonal morality, and that the quest for a
comprehensive moral theory that accounts for the totality of moral relations must integrate these
two perspectives in a way that overcomes the problem of prioritization. Various integration
options from the current philosophical literature are explained and rejected before I provide my
own account of how the Ethic of Care and the Ethic of Justice can interact, together providing a
comprehensive moral theory capable of guiding action for the entire range of moral relations. === Arts, Faculty of === Philosophy, Department of === Graduate |
author |
Fisher, Johnna Elizabeth Ann |
spellingShingle |
Fisher, Johnna Elizabeth Ann The 'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems |
author_facet |
Fisher, Johnna Elizabeth Ann |
author_sort |
Fisher, Johnna Elizabeth Ann |
title |
The 'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems |
title_short |
The 'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems |
title_full |
The 'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems |
title_fullStr |
The 'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems |
title_full_unstemmed |
The 'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems |
title_sort |
'ethic of care' : subtitle its promise and its problems |
publishDate |
2009 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/2429/13683 |
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