Theory and Practice of Whistleblower–Based on Implementation Rules of Internal Audit and Internal Control System of Financial Holding Companies and Banking Industries Article 34-2

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 事業經營法務碩士在職學位學程 === 107 === Beginning with a presentation of the theoretical basis of whistleblowing system , this thesis considers whether current domestic whistleblowing systems provide appropriate normative density and sufficient protection to whistleblowers. By comparing the whi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Wei-Chun Liu, 劉威君
Other Authors: Ching-Ping Shao
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2019
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/26nvf9
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 事業經營法務碩士在職學位學程 === 107 === Beginning with a presentation of the theoretical basis of whistleblowing system , this thesis considers whether current domestic whistleblowing systems provide appropriate normative density and sufficient protection to whistleblowers. By comparing the whistleblowing systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan and exploring the internal whistleblowing systems of foreign financial industries, this thesis will serve as reference for domestic financial holding companies and banking industries by drawing on foreign legislation and practice norms. In addition to foreign laws and practices, the relevant internal rules of 16 domestic financial holding companies are compared, in order to understand the differences between different internal whistleblowing system regulations. In so doing, issues are raised with respect to aspects of the legal establishment and how companies implement whistleblower protection. Finally, the following conclusions and recommendations are presented: First, the Implementation Rules of Internal Audit and Internal Control System of Financial Holding Companies and Banking Industries (hereinafter referred to as “the Implementation Rules”), Article 34-2, paragraph 4, subsections 1 and 2, are too wide-ranging and unclear. It is proposed that the Financial Supervisory Commission (hereinafter referred to as “FSC”) should place a moderate limitation on acceptable types of reporting. Second, the FSC should deny financial holding companies the right to refuse acceptance and investigation solely because a whistleblower has filed an anonymous report or is reporting on behalf of others. With regard to the unit responsible for accepting and investigating reported issues, it is proposed that an internal auditing unit should be given high priority. With a well-developed whistleblowing system in place, third party organizations can provide more robust and trustworthy reporting channels. In line with foreign financial industries, domestic financial holding companies should also prohibit anyone who tries to identify a whistleblower. In order to avoid differences in the whistleblowing systems of financial holding companies, the FSC should promulgate model guidelines or instruct business associations to do so. Based on these model guidelines, financial holding companies can then create their own in-house regulations or guidelines and disclose these on the company’s official website. Finally, following legalization for whistleblowing, it is even more important to integrate “whistleblowing responsibility” and “whistleblower protection” into the culture of corporate governance. This will encourage whistleblowers to report wrongdoing and promote effective use of the functions of rectification