Research on the Relationship among Channel Decision, Coverage Choice, and Accident Risks - An Empirical Study of Car Damage Insurance in Taiwan

• Main Authors: Wei-Lin Hsu, 徐瑋琳
• Other Authors: 劉俊廷
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2019
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/rmfnwb

碩士 === 國立臺中科技大學 === 保險金融管理系 === 107 === Adverse selection and moral hazard have always been central topics in the insurance literature. Previous studies have focused on verifying the relationship between coverage choice and accident risks and on distinguishing adverse selection from moral hazard based on the time variability in claimed accidents. However, none of these studies have examined why high-risk individuals choose high-assurance policies and lead to high claimed accidents from the perspective of the channel decision of the policy holder. This paper uses the car damage insurance policy information in Taiwan to verify the relationship among the channel decision of the policyholder, coverage choice, and accident risks and to check whether an adverse selection or moral hazard exists in Taiwan’s car damage insurance market. The empirical results reveal that the accident risks and coverage choice of the dealer-owned agent channel are significantly higher than those of other channels, thereby confirming that high-risk individuals will insure the insurance channel of the vehicle dealer based on the superior service of claim settlement and then choose the high-security policy. Therefore, the channel decision made by the policy holder to consider the degree of risks forms the conditional positive correlation between coverage choice and accident risks. This finding proves the coexistence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the car damage insurance market of Taiwan.