| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 財政學系 === 107 === To reap superior benefits, collaboration with competitors is quite common in contests, rent-seeking activity is no exception. In some cases, players would collaborate with each other to “grow the pie”, rather than merely struggling to “split the pie”. However, within rent-seeking literature, there is a surprising lack of information on co-opetition game. Thus, this paper expands the two-dimensional rent-seeking model in Faria et al. (2014), attempting to analysis how heterogeneous abilities would affect rent-seeking activity when two players decide rent-seeking effort (pie-division effort) and lobby effort (pie-creation effort) simultaneously. Different from existing studies’ findings that the increase in rent-seekers’ ability heterogeneity will reduce rent-seeking waste, we found rent-seeking waste may increase under certain circumstances. To be more precise, when government officials tend to grant whatever is requested, the increase in rent-seekers’ ability heterogeneity will increase rent-seeking waste instead.
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