The Impact of Diretor’and Officers’Liability Insurance on Investments - Executive Compensation as Mediator Variables

• Main Authors: Rui-Hong Lu, 呂睿宏
• Other Authors: Ya-Yi Chao
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2019
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/hzf4nw

碩士 === 國立高雄科技大學 === 會計資訊系 === 107 === The objectives of this research is to explore and exam the relationships between related Directors’ and Officers’ liability insurance (D&O) and investments using chief executive officers’ (CEOs) compensation as mediator variables. I apply an empirical study with 10,040 observations from publicly listed firms in Taiwan during the period from 2008 to 2017. Using ordinary least squares regression analysis I find that D&O is positively related to the compensation contract designed by the Board of Directors, it indicates that the higher amount of insurance is more likely to design incentives contract for encouraging investment. The higher amount of insurance also encourages　CEOs to implement risky investments. Furthermore, the separation of control and share rights is positively correlated to investments, that indicate a large separation of control and share rights is the more likely to implement risky investments. That is negative relation between the separation of control and share rights and compensation contract which pronounced in less profitable firms.