Agency Problem and Investment Efficiency: The Moderating Effect of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance

• Main Authors: CHENG, JU-TING, 鄭如庭
• Other Authors: LU, CHENG-SHOU
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2019
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/252j34

碩士 === 國立高雄科技大學 === 財富與稅務管理系 === 107 === The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationships between the management ownership, core agency problem and investment efficiency, respectively, and examine that whether D&O insurance influence the relationship between management ownership, core agency problem and investment efficiency. The sample includes the public listed companies ranging from 2009 to 2017 in Taiwan. The empirical results indicate that management ownership can improve investment efficiency, and firms with more severe core agency problem are likely to make an over-investment decision. Furthermore, D&O insurance coverage can help manages to transfer litigation risk, and induce moral hazard problem of manages, while reducing the positive effect of management ownership on investment efficiency. However, D&O insurance have a monitoring effect and mitigate the negative impact of core agency problem on investment efficiency. The results can provide practical advice from the competent authorities and strengthen the relevant regulations and systems of corporate governance and D&O insurance.