| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立高雄科技大學 === 財富與稅務管理系 === 107 === This study mainly explores the relationship between the directors’ and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) and firm value. The sample includes the public listed companies ranging from 2008 to 2017 in Taiwan. The results show that the firms D&O insurance has no effects on firm value. Further employing the D&O insurance coverage as an explanatory variable, this study finds that D&O insurance coverage has an inverted U-shaped relation with firm value,, indicating that firm performance increases with D&O insurance coverage at a low level of coverage, but decreases with D&O insurance coverage at a high level of coverage. This result demonstrates that the moral hazard effect dominates the monitoring incentive effect when D&O insurance coverage is high enough. On the contrary, at a low level of D&O insurance coverage, the monitoring mechanism effect dominates the moral hazard effect.
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