Do Long Tenure Board of Directors Invest Risky Projects? Evidence from Innovation Activity Investments

• Main Authors: Zhang, Chang-Lun, 張暢倫
• Other Authors: Hsueh, Ming-Hsien
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2019
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32nmh5

碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 會計學系 === 107 === The purpose of this study is to explore how the board tenure affects innovative investment strategies. Agency theory and resource dependence theory confirm that changes in the board characteristics will affect a company to do innovation investment strategies. Most of previous literatures regarding to management tenure mainly focused on the influence of CEO tenure on innovation investment (Chen, 2013), and the literatures focusing on board characteristics were rarely related to the relationship between board tenure and innovation investment. Therefore, the main purpose of this study is mainly to supplement the literature on the relevance of the board tenure to the innovative investment strategies. Innovation investment strategies can be further divided into self-research and development and external patent purchasing. This study further explores that board tenure influence on the previous two strategies is relatively high, and also collates the literatures on the differences and similarities between the two different innovation investment strategies. This study used sample data from 2007 to 2016 to examine the impact of the board tenure on innovation investment strategies, self-R&D investments, and external patent purchasing. The findings generally support our hypothesis. There is a non-linear relationship between the board tenure and innovation investment strategies, revise the empirical results of Bravo and Reguera-Alvarado (2017), and different innovation investment strategies: self-R&D investment or external patent purchasing, have different correlation with the board tenure.