| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 經濟學系 === 107 === This paper attempts to use the analytical framework of the New Keynesian model and considers the optimal basket of currency weights of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to analyze the composition of the central bank at the SDR exchange rate and special drawing rights. When the exchange rate of the currency of any constituent country of the special drawing right , the domestic exchange rate, or inflation is pegged to the target, what will happen to the equilibrium exchange rate and inflation rate, or when the weight of the basket of special drawing rights changes? What is the impact of the welfare effect?
This paper finds that regardless of whether the central bank chooses to peg the SDR exchange rate or not, it has no effect on the policy when the inflation rate has been pegged or the inflation rate is not pegged, but if it is pegged to the currency of any constituent country of the special drawing right When the exchange rate and the domestic inflation rate, the welfare at this time is large. However, when the central bank sets the SDR exchange rate equal to zero (zero exchange rate policy), the peg to zero exchange rate has different effects on the welfare of the central bank when it has been pegged to inflation or not pegged to inflation.
This paper also finds that the welfare effect of the central bank at the same time pinning the exchange rate between the inflation rate and the constituent countries of the special drawing rights will be greater than the welfare effect of the central bank simultaneously pinning the inflation rate and the exchange rate pegged to the special drawing rights; The welfare effect of only pegged inflation rate is greater than the welfare effect of the central bank's choice to peg the target inflation rate and the peg to the special drawing rights; and the central bank chooses to peg the target inflation rate and peg the special drawing rights The welfare effect of the exchange rate of the national currency.
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