Applying Game Theory for the Competition and Cooperation Relationships between On-line Car Sharing Schemes and Mass Transportation Systems-A Case of National Kaohsiung Normal University Students

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 交通管理科學系碩士在職專班 === 107 === The predicament of mass transportation in TAIWAN:the coverage of the mass transportation network of the road is not universal after building,it’s convenience is not as good as private transportation. A trip often has to be completed with Multiple transfers...

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Main Authors: Zong-HanCai, 蔡宗翰
Other Authors: Shou-Ren Hu
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2019
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/6jtz87
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spelling ndltd-TW-107NCKU51190322019-10-26T06:24:16Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/6jtz87 Applying Game Theory for the Competition and Cooperation Relationships between On-line Car Sharing Schemes and Mass Transportation Systems-A Case of National Kaohsiung Normal University Students 應用賽局理論探討小客車即時共乘與大眾運輸間競合關係-以國立高雄師範大學學生為例 Zong-HanCai 蔡宗翰 碩士 國立成功大學 交通管理科學系碩士在職專班 107 The predicament of mass transportation in TAIWAN:the coverage of the mass transportation network of the road is not universal after building,it’s convenience is not as good as private transportation. A trip often has to be completed with Multiple transfers when they use mass transportation, they waste a lot of time on the move.A problems is that Mass transportation always unable get to reach the destination directly.The total fare that people have to pay for using mass transportation has far exceeded private transportation. Based on the above reasons, mass transportation cannot attract people to use. No matter how many policy incentives the government, Mass transportation cannot satisfy the diversity travel requirements of the people.Therefore, mass transportation is forced to reduce service, It can only rely on the government’s subsidy,this is a vicious circle. This study is based on the research scope of the National Kaohsiung Normal University analysis of the competition and cooperation by On-line Car Sharing to mass transportation.After verification by the MNL and the Sequential Game, the respondents still prefer to use Mass Transportation in the city center, and the suburban trips are best served by the cooperation program.According to the research results, I suggestions transportation policies are given to the Kaohsiung City Government. Shou-Ren Hu 胡守任 2019 學位論文 ; thesis 90 zh-TW
collection NDLTD
language zh-TW
format Others
sources NDLTD
description 碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 交通管理科學系碩士在職專班 === 107 === The predicament of mass transportation in TAIWAN:the coverage of the mass transportation network of the road is not universal after building,it’s convenience is not as good as private transportation. A trip often has to be completed with Multiple transfers when they use mass transportation, they waste a lot of time on the move.A problems is that Mass transportation always unable get to reach the destination directly.The total fare that people have to pay for using mass transportation has far exceeded private transportation. Based on the above reasons, mass transportation cannot attract people to use. No matter how many policy incentives the government, Mass transportation cannot satisfy the diversity travel requirements of the people.Therefore, mass transportation is forced to reduce service, It can only rely on the government’s subsidy,this is a vicious circle. This study is based on the research scope of the National Kaohsiung Normal University analysis of the competition and cooperation by On-line Car Sharing to mass transportation.After verification by the MNL and the Sequential Game, the respondents still prefer to use Mass Transportation in the city center, and the suburban trips are best served by the cooperation program.According to the research results, I suggestions transportation policies are given to the Kaohsiung City Government.
author2 Shou-Ren Hu
author_facet Shou-Ren Hu
Zong-HanCai
蔡宗翰
author Zong-HanCai
蔡宗翰
spellingShingle Zong-HanCai
蔡宗翰
Applying Game Theory for the Competition and Cooperation Relationships between On-line Car Sharing Schemes and Mass Transportation Systems-A Case of National Kaohsiung Normal University Students
author_sort Zong-HanCai
title Applying Game Theory for the Competition and Cooperation Relationships between On-line Car Sharing Schemes and Mass Transportation Systems-A Case of National Kaohsiung Normal University Students
title_short Applying Game Theory for the Competition and Cooperation Relationships between On-line Car Sharing Schemes and Mass Transportation Systems-A Case of National Kaohsiung Normal University Students
title_full Applying Game Theory for the Competition and Cooperation Relationships between On-line Car Sharing Schemes and Mass Transportation Systems-A Case of National Kaohsiung Normal University Students
title_fullStr Applying Game Theory for the Competition and Cooperation Relationships between On-line Car Sharing Schemes and Mass Transportation Systems-A Case of National Kaohsiung Normal University Students
title_full_unstemmed Applying Game Theory for the Competition and Cooperation Relationships between On-line Car Sharing Schemes and Mass Transportation Systems-A Case of National Kaohsiung Normal University Students
title_sort applying game theory for the competition and cooperation relationships between on-line car sharing schemes and mass transportation systems-a case of national kaohsiung normal university students
publishDate 2019
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/6jtz87
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