| Summary: | 博士 === 國立政治大學 === 財務管理學系 === 107 === I use comprehensive U.S. mergers and acquisitions transaction data to examine the relationship between takeover probability and organization capital. Organization capital is embodied in key employees and in the agglomeration of a firm’s business processes and technologies, which can improve the production efficiency and performance of the firm. I find that firms with more organization capital are more likely to become a target for a takeover. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, the results are supported by several tests for simultaneity and omitted variable issues, including propensity score matching, two-stage regression, subsample tests, and controlling for corporate governance. Furthermore, the impact of organization capital on takeover probability is more pronounced when the target firm has stable employee volatility or operates in a competitive product market. I then use a quasi-natural experiment approach to examine whether organization capital is transferable via mergers. I find that acquiring firms increase their organization capital after acquiring a target with more organization capital. Last, acquiring firms experience higher announcement abnormal returns if the target accumulates more organization capital.
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