The Relationship between Manager Overconfidence and the Accessibility of Annual Shareholder Meetings
碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 金融碩士在職學位學程 === 107 === This paper investigates the effect of managerial overconfidence on the accessibility of annual stockholder meetings. Our samples consist of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Market from 2007 to 2017. First, we find that companies with managerial overconfidence c...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
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2019
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xu3ws3 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 金融碩士在職學位學程 === 107 === This paper investigates the effect of managerial overconfidence on the accessibility of annual stockholder meetings. Our samples consist of firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Market from 2007 to 2017. First, we find that companies with managerial overconfidence conduct the annual shareholder meeting earlier. The nexus between managerial overconfidence and the annual shareholder meeting is negatively moderated by the degree of divergence between control rights and cash flow rights. Second, we show that firms with managerial overconfidence tend to hold their meetings on days when there is a high concentration of the annual shareholder meeting. The relationship between managerial overconfidence and the concentration of the annual shareholder meeting is negatively moderated by the number of directors. Finally, we demonstrate that firms with managerial overconfidence are likely to increase the accessibility of the annual general meeting.
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