Competitive Structure and Firms’ Collusion Stability: The Role of Network Externality
碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 財稅學系 === 107 === This paper considers the externalities of the network and compares the collusion stability between the two firms under quantitative competition and price competition. This paper finds that when there is no network externality, the price competition is more unstable t...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2019
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7623vs |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 財稅學系 === 107 === This paper considers the externalities of the network and compares the collusion stability between the two firms under quantitative competition and price competition. This paper finds that when there is no network externality, the price competition is more unstable than the quantity competition. When considering the externality of the network, we find that when the degree of network externality is larger enough, the collusion with the quantity competition is more unstable than the price competition; when the network externality is smaller, the collusion. The result is the same as without network externalities.
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