Analysis of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on Archaeological Sites Preservation and Development Institution Design

• Main Authors: YANG,YA-YUAN, 楊雅媛
• Other Authors: CHEN,CHIEN-YUAN
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2019
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/846bfj

碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 土地管理學系 === 107 === Taiwan’s archaeological sites are always destructed due to the reasons of economic or real estate development and mostly done by property owners. This is because archaeological sites as like one kind of public goods, which have the features of non-rival and non-exclusive and need to be protected and supplied through government regulation and intervention. However, most archaeological sites in Taiwan are owned privately, which make proper rights unclearly delineated and would likely create so-called problems of commons tragedy. Ostrom(1990) ever indicated that the problem of commons is the typical game of prisoners’ dilemma and could be resolved by properly adjusted the matrix inside the game. Therefore, our research intends to apply property right and game theory to analyze Taiwan’s institution of archaeological sites preservation and discuss the ways in which the institutional incentive structure can be properly rearranged and lead every associated stakeholder have more incentives to protect archaeological sites rather than destroy them.