The Relationship Between Executive Compensation And Institutional Investors’ Horizon In Taiwan

• Main Authors: WANG, TING-WEN, 王婷玟
• Other Authors: Cheng, Lee-Young
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2019
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/632r32

碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 財務金融系研究所 === 107 === This study focuses on the correlation between institutional investors’ investment horizons and executive compensation. The research period of this paper is from 2007 to 2017, with listed companies of Taiwan as research samples. The empirical results show that the longer the investment period of institutional investors, the better the long-term incentive salary of CEOs; the shorter the investment period of institutional investors, the better the short-term incentives salary for CEOs. In addition, this study also makes a further analysis of the impact of the length of investment period of institutional investors on executive compensation. The results show that in the case of short-term institutional investors, the short-term incentives salary of CEOs will be better; On the other hand, in the case of long-term institutional investors, its role as a supervisory company will be stronger, and the long-term incentives salary of CEOs will be better.