Are Family Businesses Less Likely to Implement Real Earnings Management - an Empirical Analysis of the System of Legal Directors and Supervisors in Taiwan?

• Main Authors: CHEN, JUN-WEI, 陳均瑋
• Other Authors: WEI, YU-SHAM
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/z7fcr4

碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 會計系 === 106 === The purpose of this study is to explore whether family businesses are less likely to implement earnings management - an empirical analysis of the system of legal directors and supervisors in Taiwan? In the Taiwan stock exchange listed companies between 2013 and 2016, data analysis, the empirical results found that corporate entity directors and supervisors ratio is larger, the lower board effectiveness, cannot develop supervisory function effectively, the substance may be enforced by earnings management. On the system of legal directors and supervisors in Taiwan, the family firms can make control with relatively few holdings, has higher control, board seat-control and cash flow right deviation degree, so the family interests and corporate interests, deprivation effect, result in family business is not necessarily more not to be real earnings management. In addition, compared with non-family firms, family firms are more likely to carry out substantial earnings management in terms of discretionary expenditure.