The Impact of Managerial Ability on Stock Price Crash Risk：From Agent Perspective

• Main Authors: Hsin Yu Fan, 范心瑜
• Other Authors: Fengyi Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7f7unm

碩士 === 國立臺北科技大學 === 經營管理系碩士班 === 106 === This study selects Taiwanese listed companies from 2007 to 2017. From agent perspective, it discusses the impact of managerial ability on the stock price crash risk, and examines whether corporate governance has moderator effect between managerial ability and stock price crash risk. When the company is in the whole industry and electronics industry, the empirical results show that managerial ability have a positive and significant impact on the stock price crash risk, which means that managers with higher ability will improve their own income for their own benefit and to protect job security, the tendency to conceal the bad news strategically, increasing information asymmetry, thereby increasing the stock price crash risk. Corporate governance system protects the equity of the company’s fund providers. The main purpose of this study is to reduce the agency between the shareholders and managers. Therefore, this study further explores the impact of corporate governance on managerial ability and stock price crash risk. And further discover that in the electronics industry, when the institutional holdings volatility, chairman and general manager for the same person, the board of directors is larger in scale, the higher the number of independent directors, there is a significant impact on the managerial ability and the stock price crash risk. It is shows that the more institutional holdings volatility, institutional investors with unstable stocks pay more attention to short-term performance, which will worsen managers’ hiding of bad corporate news and increase the stock price crash risk. It represents when the chairman and the general manager are the same, it will result in centralized power, the conflict of interest worsened and reduce the supervision efficiency, increase the stock price crash risk. The board of directors is larger, board members can objectively formulate decisions on business operations and are not affected by the controlling shareholders, so that transparency of corporate financial statements can be further enhanced, thereby reducing the occurrence of stock price crash risk. The higher the number of independent directors, the more objective the business can make the decision-making to reduce managers for their own interests in earnings management or using information asymmetry to hide bad news to reduce stock price crash risk.