Game Theory in Reel Life: Resource Co-Management in the Donggang Sakura Shrimp Fishery

• Main Authors: Colby Hyde, 周海闊
• Other Authors: Yu-Hui Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2727cr

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 農業經濟學研究所 === 106 === An experimental, common-pool resource game with a decentralized sanctioning mechanism was tested to analyze the effects of imperfect information on co-management cooperation. A co-management organization of Sakura Shrimp fishermen in Donggang, Taiwan, served as inspiration for this experiment. Potential errors in fisheries monitoring technologies were the key experimental variable. The game followed the design of a voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) with a private market and a common-pool resource market dependent on the collective contributions of all players in groups of four. Players observed the contributions of others within their group and were given the opportunity to punish non-cooperators. Subjects participated in one of three versions of the game, each varying the accuracy of the contribution signal displayed. Errors in the signal were normally distributed from the actual contribution value with standard deviations of 0, 0.5, and 1. Player punishments increased in both frequency and severity with increases in signal noise. However, the effect of punishment also decreased with increasing noise. Players in the treatment with standard deviation equal to 0.5 significantly punished more often and more severely. And yet also contributed significantly less to the common-pool resource and thus experienced consistently higher yields and efficiency. Anti-social punishment played a major role in all treatments and may not be appropriate for a voluntary contribution mechanism of this design.