Cheap-talk Games under Heterogeneous Discernment
碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 106 === This paper studies the information transmission between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver, where their “discernment” – the ability to discriminate states or actions – may be private information and can impose restrictions on their strategies. When age...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Others |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
2018
|
| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4p4625 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 106 === This paper studies the information transmission between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver, where their “discernment” – the ability to discriminate states or actions – may be private information and can impose restrictions on their strategies. When agents’ discernment is common knowledge, the sender would never fully reveal his private information unless he is worse at discriminating states than the receiver. When agents’ discernment is private information, it is shown that indeterminacy of meaning might exist under certain situations.
|
|---|