| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 106 === In Taiwan, it remains a subject of substantial debate whether there is a corporate governance model that is better than others are. To examine supervision power among different corporate governance models, this study compares level of earnings management, related-party transactions, and potential frauds among different corporate governance models adopted by Taiwanese listed firms. The empirical results indicate that there is not a certain corporate governance model that is completely better than others are in terms of mitigating level of earnings management, related-party transactions, and potential frauds. After taking into account potential endogeneity in voluntary independent director appointment and voluntary audit committee establishment, the empirical results still support this conclusion. These findings imply that each corporate governance model leaves room to be improved, and imposition of independent director appointment and audit committee establishment on Taiwanese listed firms by the Financial Supervisory Commission is inappropriate.
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