The Boundary of Disclosure Regulations─Apply Behavioral Economics to the Insurer''s Duty of Disclosure in Financial Consumer Protection Act

• Main Authors: Hsiao-Chi Tseng, 曾筱棋
• Other Authors: 汪信君
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/t6qcz4

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 法律學研究所 === 106 === Over recent decades, with the development of financial markets have come highly complex, professional and technical characteristics of insurance products, which keeps deteriorating the information asymmetry between insurers and insurance consumers. Given that mandatory disclosure has been traditionally considered an appropriate regulatory response to market failures that stem from asymmetric information and widely adopted as an effective regulatory tool in the context of financial consumer protection, there appears to be necessity of imposing the duty of disclosure on insurers to protect insurance consumers. In fact, disputes over solicitation arising from insurance industries, particularly disputes over whether the insurers had fully explained the important aspects of their products, have long been one of the most common types of financial consumer disputes in Taiwan. Besides, while the Financial Consumer Protection Act entered into force in 2011, it provided a legal basis for the insurer’s duty of disclosure at the same time. However, insights from behavioral economics have shown that people do display systematic biases in judgement and decision-making. The effectiveness of statutory disclosure requirements therefore encounters more and more questions and challenges. For these reasons, this paper wishes to discuss the limitation of the effectiveness of disclosure regulations from the view of behavioral economics and subsequently investigate whether there is still room for improvement with regard to the insurer''s duty of disclosure in the Financial Consumer Protection Act.