| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 公共事務研究所 === 106 === This thesis focuses on the central government’s supplemental appropriations in Taiwan. It mainly collects and summarizes the relevant literature and data of the 9 times of supplemental appropriations from FY 1998 to FY 2011, in order to understand the systems of supplemental appropriations and the contents of supplemental appropriations. Further, it analyzes the budget approval process, in order to understand the disputes, the differences between system and the budget approval process and the links of content and the budget approval process. Finally, it analyzes the consensus, differences, and interactions between the executive, the legislative, the ruling parties and the opposition parties.
First, in the systems and contents of supplemental appropriations, this thesis divides the reasons for supplemental appropriations into 5 categories to understand the differences in the distribution of funds in each category. Besides, this thesis summarizes the overall structure of supplemental appropriations and finds that proportion of the current account to the overall of supplemental appropriations is less than the ratio of the capital account. Among them, there are 6 years that the current account is less than the capital account, and there are 3 years that the current account is larger than the capital account. As far as expenditures by functions are concerned, the top 2 of the total are economic development expenditure and social welfare expenditure. However, from the point of the average, the top 2 are economic development expenditure and debt expenditure. As far as expenditures by agencies are concerned, the top 2 of the total are the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Ministry of the Interior. However, from the point of the average, the top 2 are the Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Ministry of Finance.
Second, in the analysis of the budget approval process, this thesis divides the disputes into 3 categories and 8 items. This thesis finds that the legality of the supplemental appropriations has been questioned constantly. The root of the disputes comes from “major accident” and “legal budget” in article 79, paragraph 3 of the budget law, especially when the Executive Yuan uses this paragraph to respond to the expansionary fiscal policy or enhance the salary of public servants. In terms of financial resources, this thesis finds that the disputes over the additional revenue budget are relatively low, and the controversy of the rescissions is high. In addition, the Executive Yuan frequently exclude the restrictions of financial regulations through special regulations, and the Executive Yuan also hide the debt through the debt service fund or the requirement of postponing to pay the debt. The administrative and the legislative also have different opinions on the calculation of the surplus of previous fiscal years, arguing that whether the government should use cash basis or accrual basis, and it also relates to the issue that whether the effectiveness of the main resolution of the legislature could limit the power of the administrative.
Besides, supplemental appropriations of FY 1991 and FY 1992 are much more political than economical. From the controversy of local engineering funds to the crisis of bounced national debt, the administrative, the legislative and parties use entitlement spending as a tool for political confrontation, replacing the legal and professional considerations in the budget approval process. Political chain incidents have also caused many effects, for example, the Legislative Yuan has begun to replace budget cut with the budget block, cutting the budget for revenue or cutting the budget for expenditure uniformly, instead of cutting the budget for expenditure specifically, in order to avoid taking responsibility.
Furthermore, because supplemental appropriations have been subject to two restrictions on timeliness: first, supplemental appropriations must be implemented in the fiscal year; second, supplemental appropriations couldn’t be paid before the budget approval process, the proposal timing of supplemental appropriations and the delay of budget approval process are also the main points in this thesis.
In conclusion, this thesis argues that there are disputes over legality, the Executive Yuan could first think about how to properly distribute policy interests. Second, although there are disputes over rescissions, the cut of expenditure and the increase in income are the functions of the Legislative Yuan. Therefore, if the Executive Yuan proposes supplemental appropriations, rescissions could be a proper source of income to reduce the government’s dependence on debts. Third, the administrative and the legislative should not exclude financial regulations through special regulations, and should not use the special regulations to exclude the budget system to extend the period of supplemental appropriations. It will undermine the spirit of the budget law and the fiscal discipline of the central government. In addition, the administrative, the legislative and the parties should not allow political chain incidents to reappear with entitlement spending as a tool for political confrontation. Finally, this thesis finds that delay of the budget approval process is a serious problem because supplemental appropriations have been subject to two restrictions on timeliness. This thesis suggests that the Executive Yuan could first think about how to reduce the controversy of financial resources to avoid postponing the budget approval process.
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