North Korea’s Brinkmanship and Non-cooperative Game
碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 106 === Since 1994, North Korea has successfully forced its neighbors to provide financial and resourse aid by escalating the threat of nuclear weapons sa well as missile tests. This article tries to explain the reasons, means and how North Korea succeeded behind a seri...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2018
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/m38sc5 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 106 === Since 1994, North Korea has successfully forced its neighbors to provide financial and resourse aid by escalating the threat of nuclear weapons sa well as missile tests. This article tries to explain the reasons, means and how North Korea succeeded behind a series of extreme actions from the perspective of “brinkmanship” and non-cooperative game analysis. This article also tries to analyze if the United Nations is able to use sanctions to force North Korea to back down and to remove nuclear weapons in the presence or absence of China and Russia. We find that North Korea will only yield under the condition that no country violates the sanctions from the resolution of the United Nations.
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