Strategic Analysis of Patent Behavior

• Main Authors: Chun-Yuan Cheng, 鄭鈞元
• Other Authors: Tru-Gin Liu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qxa9vv

碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 106 === In recent years, the value of patents increased year by year, The application of the strategy of patent competition already belongs to the market competition. The purpose of the patent wars and litigation is (1) to protect their R&D products (2) to force the opponent out of the market (3) promote their patents in order to earn royalties or earn more than " lucrum cessans " compensation. This article in right infringement information completely and incompletely below situation, by anticipated angle inferential reasoning, in the patent manufacturer applies its under improvement, lawsuit, reconciliation and other strategies, two manufacturers the change of profit around the patent due date, and analyze the bilateral manufacturers in the equilibrium result that under these strategy interactions has. The results show that patent holder will not be affected by the infringement Manufacturer in the complete information and patent holder profit will be affected by the profitability of the infringement in the Incomplete Information. In the case of the settlement gold, no matter whether the improvement or not, the settlement will not be affected in the case of perfect information . Different amounts of settlement gold if the information is imperfect. However, all the strategies for the patent must depand on cost, When the cost is higher than the profit ,the company must consider whether to conduct the patent litigation.