The impact of corporate governance and manager overconfidence on the value of corporate cash holdings in Taiwan

碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 財務金融學系 === 106 === Among various types of corporate assets, cash is easier-obtained and more likely to be manipulated by the management team. Although cash holdings can increase the value of the company, holding excess cash may cause more agency problems in particular when the mana...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Ming-Chen Lin, 林明臻
Other Authors: Pei-Shih Weng
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2018
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3wdnk2
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 財務金融學系 === 106 === Among various types of corporate assets, cash is easier-obtained and more likely to be manipulated by the management team. Although cash holdings can increase the value of the company, holding excess cash may cause more agency problems in particular when the manager is overconfident. We hypothesize that good corporate governance should be able to alleviate agency problems and save the value of corporate cash holdings. This study, therefore, examines the impact of corporate governance on the value of cash holdings under the manager's overconfidence. By 779 public-listed companies in Taiwan as the sample, this study uses the representative corporate governance ranking executed by the Taiwan Stock Exchange to perform the analysis. The empirical findings show that, under the managerial overconfidence, for one New Taiwan Dollar (NTD) cash holding increase, the value of cash holding increases by 0.546 NTD for the well-governed companies and only 0.342 NTD for the companies with weak governance.