A Mechanism Application to Match Charities Organizations and Donees Based on Cooperative Game Approaches

• Main Authors: Chen-Yu Lan, 藍陳淯
• Other Authors: Chih-Peng Chu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/x4a4pj

碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 企業管理學系 === 106 === Not many studies focused on the matching problem between charities organizations and donees. In real world, the uneven distribution phenomena among the donees exists. Sometimes, a donee case could receive too much charities resource. Sometimes, the charities are not located to a donee case with higher priority. This study applied "deferred acceptance algorithm" to design a matching platform for charities organizations and donees. This platform makes the charities distribution process logical and transparent. Therefore, the charities organizations will distribute their resources more efficiently. This platform can also serve as a reference for social workers in order to achieve the value of charities. In the three scenarios designed in this study, the results of them all support that the deferred acceptance algorithm has a better performance than the current matching mechanism and Boston matching mechanism.