| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 科技法律研究所 === 106 === Different types of related-party transactions problems would occur in multiple situations. In single firm, agency problem can emerge from asset expropriation by either management or controlling shareholder. In corporate groups, tunneling easily exists between parent company and its subsidiaries. In the case of financial conglomerates, they profit from the benefit of economies of scale on the one hand. On the other, they are not only subject to similar expropriation by parent company, but also face severe systemic risk contagion due to its group structure. by analyzing the aforementioned problems, This thesis presents the various aspects of related-party transactions in financial group in the 21st century.
Enacted in 2001, the Financial Holding Company Act of Taiwan open up its door to conglomeration. Nevertheless, it also creates the too-big-to-fail problem. Likewise, the inter- and intra-connections in these conglomerates and the systemic risk problem that evidenced in the 2008 financial crisis are looming larger than ever. This thesis depicts forms of related-party transaction in present Taiwan and their problems. By doing this, it provides a deeper examination of the possibility of the future occurrence of such systemic risk in our financial system.
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