Utilizing Pin Manipulation and Spare Cells to Obfuscate Interconnect Structures in Split Manufacturing

• Main Authors: Huang, Guan-Ming, 黃冠銘
• Other Authors: Chen, Hung-Ming
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2xf2fd

碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 電機工程學系 === 106 === The purpose of split manufacturing is to enhance the security of the design house’s layout when it is manufactured by a foundry. However, it is not completely secure. Recent research suggests that attacks like reverse-engineering, hardware Trojans and network flow attacks can still cause serious threats. Most of the split manufacturing defense techniques focus on the gate level relationship measured by k-security secure metric to ensure the security of layouts. These techniques, however, do not consider the net relationship and distance between pins. In this work, we focus on the corresponding relationship between the cut-nets and the split layer pins. We further propose two ways of obfuscation: a) add the virtual pin in split layer and b) the spare cells used in engineer change order (ECO) to obfuscate the attacker. These methods result in very low to no overhead of wirelength to ensure security. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our two techniques against proximity attack for all the testcases. We can achieve that the wirelength overhead will not be increased more than 0.5%, and the rate of successful attack of net connection is lower than 2% for our cases.