Capacity Coordination for Supply Chains with a Single Supplier and Two Competing Retailers

• Main Authors: Wan-JuSun, 孫婉如
• Other Authors: Yeu-Shiang Huang
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/48yuz9

碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 工業與資訊管理學系 === 106 === In considering current complex business models, suppliers not only consider manufacturing problems but also product properties and target consumer segments, and they would like to cooperate with multiple retailers to enhance product exposure and revenues. However, the sophisticated manufacturing process and innovative technology of high-tech products often may result in product shortage due to an unpredictable product yield rate. In addition, the stochastic yield rate leads to retailers’ over-ordering strategy to gain more capacity from suppliers. The over-ordering problem often results in that suppliers mistakenly forecast the market demand and decrease the efficiency of the supply chain. This study develops a game theoretic model, in which a signal supplier simultaneously offers a product to a retailer with a long-term cooperative relationship and a new retailer in a supply chain system, to investigate the optimal capacity coordination strategy. Suppose that the supplier and two retailers are a leader and followers, respectively, in a Stackelberg model, and the interaction between the two rival retailers is Cournot competition. We use the strategic capacity allocation rather than the proportional allocation to mitigate the capacity competition between the two retailers. In addition, due to the uncertain yield rate, we use the revenue sharing to compensate the supplier’s lost and encourage supplier to produce more to reduce the product shortage. Consequently, with the strategic capacity allocation and revenue sharing, the members can coordinate and increase their revenue in the whole supply chain.