| Summary: | 博士 === 國立政治大學 === 宗教研究所 === 106 === My dissertation focuses on how the concepts of Two Truths, Dependent-Arising (Pratītyasamutpāda) and Logic (hetuvidyā), interact in Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka Philosophy.
It is important to know how Bhāviveka explains Madhyamaka Philosophy, particularly when he admits that each thing has its own nature in conventional reality. However, there are few studies on his interpretation of the relationship between Dependent-Arising and emptiness.
First, my dissertation works on the translation of Chapter 1—The Analysis of Dependent-Arising—in the Tibetan version of Prajñāpradīpa and explains how Bhāviveka's concept of Dependent-Arising is placed within his perspective pertaining to the Combination of Two Truths.
The two versions—the Tibetan version and the Chinese version—are compared to spot any differences between them and I found out that the difference is related to the concept of "Combining of Two Truths," with which the Tibetan version seems to be more consistent. The concept of Combining of Two Truths means that one has to admit that the prerequisite of everything is empty in the ultimate truth before describing the phenomena of Dependent-Arising because this prerequisite guarantees that there is no any concept of Dependent-Arising from the viewpoint of fundamentalism. This is in accordance with Bhāviveka's using the qualification “from the viewpoint of ultimate truth” such that he can ensure the boundary of emptiness. In other words, if the concept of Dependent-Arising issues forth from the viewpoint of fundamentalism, where the Chinese version seems to be, the demonstration for the proof of emptiness will encounter some problems. Therefore, Bhāviveka's concept of Dependent-Arising and his use of logic are inseparably related.
In addition, this dissertation proves Bhāviveka's theory of Two Truths, from his works Prajñāpradīpa and Jewels in the hand (*Karatalaratn) instead of from the Tibetan tenets, that each thing has its own nature in the conventional truth and how this can be the basis for his application of logic. Even though he uses logic to demonstrate assertions, in the appendix of Prajñāpradīpa (after Chapter 27), he supplements that intentionally even logic is empty in the ultimate truth, such that his ultimate intention of using logic as an illusory tool can be understood. Because of that, the criticism from the Prāsaṅgika school is not appropriate. In other words, Bhāviveka's method may seem to be different from Nāgārjuna's, but his use of logic, placed under his theory of Two Truths, does not violate the spirit of Madhyamaka Philosophy.
When using this application of logic, the most distinguishing feature is his usage of the qualification “from the viewpoint of ultimate truth” to explain the meaning of emptiness in Madhyamaka Philosophy. It shows that not only does this application of logic not violate Dignāga's logic system but it also inherits the methods of Indian logic.
It is always questionable as to whether Bhāviveka inherits Nāgārjuna's spirit, but it is important to understand how the atmosphere may shape the philosopher's thoughts. Bhāviveka chooses a different method in order to explain that Madhyamaka Philosophy is not nihilism. Therefore, we should examine his philosophy as a whole to fairly evaluate his thoughts.
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