Assessing Taiwan’s Deterrence against China in 2018. How well does Taiwan deter China from Subjugating the Island?

• Main Authors: Hugo Tierny, 田予光
• Other Authors: Yuan, I
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2018
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/qq5493

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS) === 106 === The goals defended by Taiwan and China are in conflict with each other; China wishes to unify, by force if necessary, and Taiwan seeks to resist annexation. The Chinese pressures against Taiwan intensified following the election of Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) in 2016. John J. Mearsheimer argues that deterrence is a function of the specific strategy available to the potential attacker. Therefore, one needs to understand both the attacker and the defender’s strategies in order to analyze the condition of a deterrence posture. Accordingly, this thesis will attempt to assess Taiwan’s deterrence by opposing China’s strategies for bringing unification to Taiwan and its allies’ responses. This study also aims to cast a new light on Taiwan’s deterrence by considering that the Chinese threat on Taiwan is two-fold, with two separated but mutually reinforcing strategies, one being political, the other military. Both form a consistent whole, an escalation process designed to push Taipei to abide by Beijing terms. Taiwan’s deterrence holds but the combination of China’s misperceptions of its adversaries, high motivations, short-of-war tactics, and growing military power could, over the long-term, create the conditions for a deterrence failure. The U.S. has recently tightened its ties to Taiwan but this development takes place amid greater Sino – U.S. tensions, which is hardly a sign of stability. Also, Taiwan is having a tough times to modernize its military at a pace commensurate with that of China. Finally, Taiwan is struggling to escape the trap set by China’s short-of-war tactics.