The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation

碩士 === 長榮大學 === 經營管理研究所 === 106 === The nickname of “fat cat” seems to be heavy for director or supervisor in general. In this study we explore whether the remuneration of the directors and supervisors is affected by board characteristics or external monitoring forces. With an sample of listed compa...

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Main Authors: Wang, Che-Sheng, 王哲聖
Other Authors: Lo, Chin-Shui
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2017
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xd28j7
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spelling ndltd-TW-106CJU004570012019-05-15T23:46:37Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xd28j7 The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation 董事會特性、外部監督力量對董監事薪酬之影響 Wang, Che-Sheng 王哲聖 碩士 長榮大學 經營管理研究所 106 The nickname of “fat cat” seems to be heavy for director or supervisor in general. In this study we explore whether the remuneration of the directors and supervisors is affected by board characteristics or external monitoring forces. With an sample of listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2015, we find that the remuneration of directors and supervisors is positively related to firm performance and board size, but negatively related to number of independent directors and CEO-Board chair. We also found a positive relationship between the directors’ share mortgage ratio and remuneration in non-family firms. The external monitoring power has no significant effect on the remuneration of directors in family firms, but will suppress the remuneration of directors in non-family firms. Lo, Chin-Shui 羅進水 2017 學位論文 ; thesis 44 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 長榮大學 === 經營管理研究所 === 106 === The nickname of “fat cat” seems to be heavy for director or supervisor in general. In this study we explore whether the remuneration of the directors and supervisors is affected by board characteristics or external monitoring forces. With an sample of listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2015, we find that the remuneration of directors and supervisors is positively related to firm performance and board size, but negatively related to number of independent directors and CEO-Board chair. We also found a positive relationship between the directors’ share mortgage ratio and remuneration in non-family firms. The external monitoring power has no significant effect on the remuneration of directors in family firms, but will suppress the remuneration of directors in non-family firms.
author2 Lo, Chin-Shui
author_facet Lo, Chin-Shui
Wang, Che-Sheng
王哲聖
author Wang, Che-Sheng
王哲聖
spellingShingle Wang, Che-Sheng
王哲聖
The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation
author_sort Wang, Che-Sheng
title The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation
title_short The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation
title_full The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation
title_fullStr The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation
title_full_unstemmed The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation
title_sort effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation
publishDate 2017
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xd28j7
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