The effects of board characteristics and external monitors on board compensation
碩士 === 長榮大學 === 經營管理研究所 === 106 === The nickname of “fat cat” seems to be heavy for director or supervisor in general. In this study we explore whether the remuneration of the directors and supervisors is affected by board characteristics or external monitoring forces. With an sample of listed compa...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2017
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xd28j7 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 長榮大學 === 經營管理研究所 === 106 === The nickname of “fat cat” seems to be heavy for director or supervisor in general. In this study we explore whether the remuneration of the directors and supervisors is affected by board characteristics or external monitoring forces. With an sample of listed companies in Taiwan from 2005 to 2015, we find that the remuneration of directors and supervisors is positively related to firm performance and board size, but negatively related to number of independent directors and CEO-Board chair. We also found a positive relationship between the directors’ share mortgage ratio and remuneration in non-family firms. The external monitoring power has no significant effect on the remuneration of directors in family firms, but will suppress the remuneration of directors in non-family firms.
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