CEO Power and Bank Loan Covenant Restrictiveness
碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程) === 105 === Existing studies illustrate that the centralization of power in CEOs creates a large influence on firm performance. The CEOs are directly responsible for decision making, but whether these strategic decisions are beneficial or detrimental for the firms...
Main Authors: | Hue-Trinh Le, 黎惠貞 |
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Other Authors: | Hsiang-Ping Tsai |
Format: | Others |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2017
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/kcb6q5 |
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