Constructive Empiricism and the Status of Time in Relation to it

碩士 === 國立陽明大學 === 心智哲學研究所 === 105 === Abstract This essay mainly aims at reinforcing constructive empiricism. The reconciliation between several issues of time and constructive empiricism constitutes an important part of this reinforcement. Specifically, I argue for two main claims. The first claim...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Abraham Lim Ken Zhi, 林肯智
Other Authors: Thomas Benda
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2017
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/xbc6d9
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立陽明大學 === 心智哲學研究所 === 105 === Abstract This essay mainly aims at reinforcing constructive empiricism. The reconciliation between several issues of time and constructive empiricism constitutes an important part of this reinforcement. Specifically, I argue for two main claims. The first claim is that the notion of time is conceptually prior to the distinction between observable and unobservable, which is the distinction crucial to constructive empiricism. The second claim is that both time exists in some sense and each of us has to believe in the existence of some temporal form. There is a strong suggestion that constructive empiricists would classify time into unobservable. Then the main implication of the first claim is that it is a category mistake for the constructive empiricists to do so. And also, there is another strong suggestion that the constructive empiricists are recommended not to believe in the existence of time. Then the implication of the second claim is that it is inevitable even for the constructive empiricist to believe in the existence of time of some form. And I argue that these two implications do not really constitute any threat to constructive empiricism. Constructive empiricists are supposed not to classify time into either class with respect to the first implication. This suffices for them to escape the first threat. As for the threat engendered by the second implication, I highlight the skeptical aspect in the position of constructive empiricism that assures the endorsers that believing in the existence of time does not amount to inflationary metaphysics the rejection of which is the main motivation for endorsing this position. Although at some point my divergences with Bas van Fraassen, who is the first and main proponent of constructive empiricism, become unavoidable I believe and elaborate that the main idea and concern of constructive empiricism is still left intact in being reconciled with issues of time. In the course of reinforcement, I draw some connections between time and possibility. I also address several issues specifically related to constructive empiricism such as introducing a rarely mentioned possibility, which can be added as one more support for constructive empiricism, and also discussing a threat concerning clairvoyance to this position.