| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 105 === In terms of the US environmental protection policies developed over years, owing to the diffusivity of environmental pollution, the federal government used to lead environmental protection policies in the early days whereas the local governments have been applying more and more proactive approaches to environmental protection policies in the recent years since they apply even more proactive approaches than the federal government does to certain cross-regional pollution. The author attempted to inquire how this happened and if diverse policy alter the central and local governmental aspirations for leadership. Since the regional pollution affects the local governmental in the most sensitive and direct way in the jurisdiction, the local government will set the stance first and the central government makes decisions in accordance with the reaction made by the local government. Consequently, the author employed the Stackelberg competition (sequential-move games) model i.e. the local government acts before the central government does to investigate how the command and control approach and the incentive-based regulation alter the governmental aspirations for leadership of environmental protection policies. The findings are as follows. If the command-and-control approach is used, the central government leads environmental protection policies. If the incentive-based regulation is used, the local government leads environmental protection policies. This evidences that diverse policy alters the central and local governmental aspirations for leadership.
|
|---|
