| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 會計學研究所 === 105 === We focus on CEOs short-termism by using Executive Compensation Duration and Real Earning Management as representative to CEOs incentive of maximizing upcoming profit and to real action of CEOs short-termism respectively. We find negative relation between Executive Compensation Duration and representatives of Real Earning Management. That is, the shorter Executive Compensation Duration the bigger Positive Real Earning Management scale. In addition, CEOs tend to not take big bath, which Discretionary Accrual Earning Management is negative, as their Executive Compensation Duration is shorter than 1 year. We also find that Executive Compensation Duration has interactive effect with Loss-avoidance company on Positive Real Earning Management. That is, in Loss-avoidance company, CEOs have more incentive to manage earnings despite the length of Executive Compensation Duration.
|
|---|
