| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 哲學研究所 === 105 === Yinshi (因是), a word reiterated several times throughout the Qiwulun chapter of Zhuangzi, has been interpreted as either a set term or a logical connector. The prominent English translation of A. C. Graham perceived yinshi and weishi (為是) as a pair of contrastive concepts: “yinshih is (…) to make relative judgments according to changing conditions like the Taoist sage; weishih is (...) to judge between alternatives according to one''s fixed preconceptions, like the Confucius and Mohists.”
In this thesis, I perform a syntactic analysis of yu A ze mo ruo B (欲A則莫若B, “if your intention is doing A, then no method compares to B”) and yi (亦, “also”), and I argue on this basis that (1) yinshi—shi that follows a particular reason—is not a distinctive feature of the sage but a general trait that is ubiquitous among everyone’s shifei (是非). The difference between the sage and the Confucians and Mohists is not the shifei they use but their attitude to shifei—both the sage and the Confucians and Mohists are using yinshi, which could explain two instances where yi immediately precedes yinshi; (2) guoshi (果是, “ultimate shi”) is a more likely candidate than weishi to constitute a contrast with yinshi. Another concern of mine is Qiwulun’s unique position on shifei and its criticism of other mingbian (名辯) debaters. I also examine the nature of Qiwulun’s criticism of rumo zhi shifei (儒墨之是非). The interchangeability between the demonstratives bi and shi (彼是, “that and this”) does not necessarily imply a similar relationship between the value judgements shi and fei. We must recognize that Qiwulun itself never simply equates bishi with shifei, and that bishi mo de qi ou (彼是莫得其偶, “bi and shi are not coupled as opposites”) only provides us with a different mindset to respond to shifei judgements.
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