| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 105 === After the financial crisis, Kim Dae-jung administration took the office. In order to reduce the debt and fulfill the loaning condition asked by IMF, Kim administration conducted a series of reformation driven by neoliberalism. The reformation focused on four main domains: chaebol, finance, labor, and government.
Most researches about the reformation after the financial crisis were focusing on finance and cheabol. They discussed the influence of the reformation on models of developing country. This research focuses on the relation between the government and the public enterprises. In South Korea, public enterprises not only play roles in providing services, but also giving access to funds, offering jobs, and implementing industrial policies before privatization. In this research, we try to address how privatization of public enterprises affects relations between the government and public enterprises.
We chose Korea Telecom as an example. Observing the two waves of privatization before and after the financial crisis, it is found that compared with the privatization reform in Kim Yong-san government, the privatization reform of Korea Telecom is deeper and faster after financial crisis. What causes the differences between two waves of privatization reforms? Why the board and the president of Korea Telecom are often have official backgrounds after the full privatization? In addition, there were traces showing that the companies operation was affected by the government. This raises questions about the relationship between the government and the privatized public enterprises.
Former literature suggests that, the financial crisis has caused the dual impact on Kim Dae-jung government, both increasing the willingness and ability for government to accelerate the privatization of public enterprises. However, former literature did not explain how the dual impact changed the policy networks of the privatization of Korea Telecom. It is neither explained the official background of the boards of Korea Telecom after the privatization.
Hugh Compston thinks that, the problem and solutions, preferences of policies, possessed resources, strategies of actors subject to changes of external environment. It also affects the regulation and rules of the policy networks itself. When any one of the five parameters is changed, it affects the resources of the actors in the network and how they exchange resources, leading to the change of policy making.
Based on the Hugh Compston''s policy network theory, four assumptions are made on the basis of the existing literature. First, the willingness of Korean Telecom to privatize is increased by the change of preference of government policy, which is influenced by the IMF institution. Second, the government compromises with the chaebols when chaebols monopolize capitals. Third, the government in the financial crisis will adopt a strategy to suppress labor unions. Labor unions, affected by the IMF system, is unable to fight against the suppression. Fourth, under the pressure of full privatization, the government shifted from the control of ownership to the control of rights of management.
We found the influence of IMF system on Kim Dae-Jung after analyze the literature. First, on the relationship between the government and the chaebol, the government tends to compromise because the money owned by the chaebol is the key to full privatization. It leads to the raise of the upper limit of the shares the chaebol can hold. Second, on the relationship between the government and the telecommunications labor unions, the Government in the financial crisis increased the control and suppressions over the labor union. On the other hand, the union was limited by the political circumstances at that time. It could not fight against the government through public pressure. Under pressure from the government, labor union were excluded from the policy network. Last, Kim Dae-jung''s strategy of "decentralizing the shareholding”, or "public enterprise without owner” during the privatization reform tried to shift the power of the company from the shareholders to professional managers and the board, in order to avoid chaebols from monopolizing the telecommunication industry after the privatization of Korea Telecom.
However, decentralized structure of shareholding, as well as the structure of management of the companies, enables the government to affect the company’s decision making by intervening the appointment of personnel such as the president, the board of directors, even though it didn’t hold any shares. In addition to the government''s influence on Korea Telecom, KT has also promoted a pro-corporate policy through improper links with the government.
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