The Strategic Interaction between Manager and Investor under Corporate Governance Evaluation

• Main Authors: KUAN, HSIN- YUN, 官歆芸
• Other Authors: CHIU, SHIH-TSUNG
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2017
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/778pwy

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 會計學系 === 105 === This study applies Spence’s (1973) model of costly job market signaling, in investigating how the change in corporate governance evaluation results released by authority affects managers' and investors' decision. Under information asymmetry, managers' tend to choose the corporate governance evaluation results that they would like to release, and then investors will make his investment decision according to that result. Therefore, we use the model of dynamic games with incomplete information to derive the possible pooling equilibria and separating equilibria, and further analyze how investors use strategies to keep the low-profit companies from imitating and distinguish between high and low remuneration companies. Our main results are as follows: 1. In separating equilibria, the probability of false news released by the companies is eliminating completely. Thus, investors can identify the actual remuneration of the company and invest appropriately. 2. The manager of the high-profit companies will choose to improve corporate governance if it will generate more benefit than cost; On the other hand, the manager of the low-profit companies will also have to consider the benefit and cost of imitating high-profit companies’ strategy.