On the Myth of the Given in Sellars’s "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"

• Main Authors: Kuan, Ting-Yu, 官庭伃
• Other Authors: Chiu, Chi-Chun
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2017
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ta2685

碩士 === 國立清華大學 === 哲學研究所 === 105 === Many philosophers think that the chain of justification of belief ultimately terminates on what is called “the Given”. Nevertheless, Sellars strongly criticizes the alleged epistemic role played by this notion, which he regards as being mysterious in nature. Although there are different ways of appealing to the Given, according to Sellars, none of them succeeds. In this thesis, my main tasks are: (1) to examine Sellars’ notion of the myth of the Given and expose how he rejects it with different arguments; (2) to elucidate Sellars’ view of justification and how he tackles with the problem of infinite regress of justification; (3) to argue against the criticisms of Sellars from Snowdon, Alston and Brandom respectively.