| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 會計與財務碩士學位學程 === 105 === There are many agency problems between owners and manager or control shareholders and minority shareholders because most of companies in Taiwan are controlled by families and the ownership structure is concentrated. This study investigates the influence of family-controlled businesses, firm performance, corporate governance and dividend policy. The data was selected from 2008 to 2015 publicly traded Taiwan companies. Using ordinary least-squares method to measure the relativity.
The study result indicates that those companies with good firm performance will be more cash to pay more dividends. But family firms can provide better supervisory mechanisms or participate management directly, that family firms do not need to pay more dividends to solve agency problem. Almost family member relationship is closely and care about long-term development, that family members tend to rely highly on retained earnings for capital investment and development because of their reluctance to reduce control. Therefore, family-controlled firms will pay lower dividends than non-family firms. In addition, corporate governance result also indicates that conform with the outcome model which is La porta et al. (2000) build. The outcome model claims that the minority shareholders may use legal power to protect their equity and the payment of dividends is the result to effective governance where well governed firms pay dividend because such payments reduces the opportunity for expropriation from shareholders and shareholders successfully pressure managers to disgorge excess cash or free cash flow.
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