CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Inside Debt, and Firm Innovation
碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 會計學系 === 105 === This paper is to examine whether CEO pay-performance sensitivities and inside debt affect firm innovation. According to agency theory, managers may damage shareholders’ wealth for maximizing their self-interest. Previous literatures have document that CEO compens...
Main Authors: | Liu,Chia-Wei, 劉嘉惟 |
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Other Authors: | 薛明賢 |
Format: | Others |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2017
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Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92qjz9 |
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