Inside Debt, Contingent Convertible Bonds, and Capital Structure

碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 105 === The recent financial crisis leads researchers to focus on contingent capital. There are a lot of reason caused financial crisis. Managers’ wealth is one of the important element caused financial crisis. In this paper, we provide a framework to analysis firm’s ca...

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Main Authors: Kung, Chun-Chan, 龔群旃
Other Authors: Huang, Hsing-Hua
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2017
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/et6czm
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spelling ndltd-TW-105NCTU53040432019-05-16T00:08:11Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/et6czm Inside Debt, Contingent Convertible Bonds, and Capital Structure 債權薪酬與或有可轉債與資本結構 Kung, Chun-Chan 龔群旃 碩士 國立交通大學 財務金融研究所 105 The recent financial crisis leads researchers to focus on contingent capital. There are a lot of reason caused financial crisis. Managers’ wealth is one of the important element caused financial crisis. In this paper, we provide a framework to analysis firm’s capital structure with the presence of inside debt and contingent convertible bonds. Our main analysis focus on the agency problem when issue contingent convertible bonds and inside debt. We show that if managers and shareholders can make investment decision, they will raise more fund from CoCo bonds rather than straight debt and result in agency problem. The presence of inside debt will reduce the incentive of managers to take risk. Huang, Hsing-Hua Lee, Han-Hsing 黃星華 李漢星 2017 學位論文 ; thesis 25 en_US
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language en_US
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description 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 105 === The recent financial crisis leads researchers to focus on contingent capital. There are a lot of reason caused financial crisis. Managers’ wealth is one of the important element caused financial crisis. In this paper, we provide a framework to analysis firm’s capital structure with the presence of inside debt and contingent convertible bonds. Our main analysis focus on the agency problem when issue contingent convertible bonds and inside debt. We show that if managers and shareholders can make investment decision, they will raise more fund from CoCo bonds rather than straight debt and result in agency problem. The presence of inside debt will reduce the incentive of managers to take risk.
author2 Huang, Hsing-Hua
author_facet Huang, Hsing-Hua
Kung, Chun-Chan
龔群旃
author Kung, Chun-Chan
龔群旃
spellingShingle Kung, Chun-Chan
龔群旃
Inside Debt, Contingent Convertible Bonds, and Capital Structure
author_sort Kung, Chun-Chan
title Inside Debt, Contingent Convertible Bonds, and Capital Structure
title_short Inside Debt, Contingent Convertible Bonds, and Capital Structure
title_full Inside Debt, Contingent Convertible Bonds, and Capital Structure
title_fullStr Inside Debt, Contingent Convertible Bonds, and Capital Structure
title_full_unstemmed Inside Debt, Contingent Convertible Bonds, and Capital Structure
title_sort inside debt, contingent convertible bonds, and capital structure
publishDate 2017
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/et6czm
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