| Summary: | 博士 === 國立中興大學 === 國際政治研究所 === 105 === The main objective of the work presented in this thesis was directed toward understanding why some insurgent movements remain unified and others falter and succumb to factionalism, intra-group fighting and fragmentation when facing state forces and other state strategies like peace accords/agreements, general amnesty, economic and political incentives. By drawing on the cases of India’s Northeast insurgencies—this study put forward the argument that the ability of the insurgent leadership to include various forms of social networks—core networks, peripheral networks and linking networks—is crucial in determining their fate against the government forces. The structure of social network upon which an insurgent organization builds its foundation determines its outward appearance and its ability to face external and internal challenges. The insurgent groups with access to all three forms of social networks are more enduring, resistant and internally cohesive than those who either lack such ties or deliberately cut off links with social networks. In this regard, the ability of the insurgent organizations to withstand external threat lies in how best the insurgent leaders take decisions and formulate strategies with respect to social networks in order to ensure elite cooperation and leadership hierarchy, and to enhance internal security in a militarily strong and politically accommodative state setting. This approach is tested with a study of 11 armed groups (and several unarmed groups) in three civil wars—Nagaland, Assam and Mizoram in India. Due to shared military and political environment and structural contexts, there is a drastic variation in and across each case of insurgency. Primary and secondary resources were used to trace out variations and similarities in their internal behavior and outward appearance. The case studies reveal strong support for the approach.
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