| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中興大學 === 會計學研究所 === 105 === The sample companies are obtained from 2010 to 2015. The article about calculating accounting conservatism refers to Khan and Watts (2009). The purpose of the article is to examine the relationship among composition of board directors, cronyism and accounting conservatism.
The empirical results indicate that the more independent directors founded, the more efficiency supervised. It’s because the independent directors need to be independent from the others and without any direct or indirect interests. That’s why they make the board improve supervision and prevent the management from selfish motives. Then, the board can promote the accounting conservatism. When increasing the board sizes, it makes accounting conservatism more effective in supervising. However, the more the proportion of directors'' shareholdings is held, the lower scores of accounting conservatism obtained.
Cronyism has a positive impact on accounting conservatism, which is confirmed by Stewardship Theory. The appropriate connection between the board and the management can make accounting conservatism increased. But, the board sizes which existed cronyism have a negative impact on accounting conservatism. Once the board sizes are getting bigger, the functions of supervision are getting weaker. It may causes the board and the management to form an alliance in order to their interests against the shareholders’ benefits.
|
|---|
