Causes of Bribery-Cases of China

碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 企業管理學系管理學碩士班 === 105 === In this study we investigate the determinants of bribery, bribe-paying, and bribe-taking using the real cases collected from courtroom judgement to investigate the determinants of bribery for listed firms in China. The empirical results from ownership structu...

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Main Authors: Li, GuoXing, 李國興
Other Authors: Pei-Gi Shu
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2017
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ktt592
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spelling ndltd-TW-105FJU005830352019-05-15T23:24:28Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ktt592 Causes of Bribery-Cases of China 企業賄賂的原因—來自中國大陸上市公司的證據 Li, GuoXing 李國興 碩士 輔仁大學 企業管理學系管理學碩士班 105 In this study we investigate the determinants of bribery, bribe-paying, and bribe-taking using the real cases collected from courtroom judgement to investigate the determinants of bribery for listed firms in China. The empirical results from ownership structure show that controlling owner’s cash flow rights are negatively correlated while his/her excess control is positively correlated with the odds of bribery. The existence and shareholdings of foreign institutional investors are both negatively correlated with the odds of lottery, indicating the monitoring function associated with foreign institutional investors. From board structure we find that the meeting frequency of supervisory boards is positively correlated with the odds of bribery, implying the malfunction and ineffectiveness associated with supervisory boards in Chinese listed firms.Finally, marketization index is positively correlated with the odds of bribery.However, after concerning the endogeneity issue associated with marketization and bribery, marketization index that is affected by the education level of the province that the underlying firm registers in is negatively correlated with the odds of bribery Pei-Gi Shu Chyi-Lun Chiou 許培基 邱琦倫 2017 學位論文 ; thesis 31 zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 輔仁大學 === 企業管理學系管理學碩士班 === 105 === In this study we investigate the determinants of bribery, bribe-paying, and bribe-taking using the real cases collected from courtroom judgement to investigate the determinants of bribery for listed firms in China. The empirical results from ownership structure show that controlling owner’s cash flow rights are negatively correlated while his/her excess control is positively correlated with the odds of bribery. The existence and shareholdings of foreign institutional investors are both negatively correlated with the odds of lottery, indicating the monitoring function associated with foreign institutional investors. From board structure we find that the meeting frequency of supervisory boards is positively correlated with the odds of bribery, implying the malfunction and ineffectiveness associated with supervisory boards in Chinese listed firms.Finally, marketization index is positively correlated with the odds of bribery.However, after concerning the endogeneity issue associated with marketization and bribery, marketization index that is affected by the education level of the province that the underlying firm registers in is negatively correlated with the odds of bribery
author2 Pei-Gi Shu
author_facet Pei-Gi Shu
Li, GuoXing
李國興
author Li, GuoXing
李國興
spellingShingle Li, GuoXing
李國興
Causes of Bribery-Cases of China
author_sort Li, GuoXing
title Causes of Bribery-Cases of China
title_short Causes of Bribery-Cases of China
title_full Causes of Bribery-Cases of China
title_fullStr Causes of Bribery-Cases of China
title_full_unstemmed Causes of Bribery-Cases of China
title_sort causes of bribery-cases of china
publishDate 2017
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/ktt592
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