The Impact of Entrenchment Index and Consultant On Compensation Committee Quality
碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融暨會計碩士班(財務金融學程) === 104 === Prior studies find that when entrenchment index increase as the limitations on shareholders’ voting power will lead managerial dicision more powerfull and support that they have poor governance. In addition, recent studies examine the CEO compensation m...
Main Authors: | Bui Phuong Chi, 裴方枝 |
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Other Authors: | Chia-Ying Chan |
Format: | Others |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
2016
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/78341867680342393518 |
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