Design of a Privacy-Preserving Data Mining System Based on Differential Privacy Using Additive-Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol Against Insider Attacks

博士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 資訊工程學研究所 === 104 === In this thesis, we consider a new insider threat for the privacy preserving work of distributed kernel-based data mining (DKBDM), such as distributed Support Vector Machine (SVM). Among several known data breaching problems, those associated with insider attack...

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Main Authors: Peter Shaojui Wang, 王紹睿
Other Authors: Feipei Lai
Format: Others
Language:en_US
Published: 2016
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63639699902141668295
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spelling ndltd-TW-104NTU053921002016-10-30T04:17:09Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63639699902141668295 Design of a Privacy-Preserving Data Mining System Based on Differential Privacy Using Additive-Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol Against Insider Attacks 可免於內部攻擊的隱私保存資料探勘系統 — 基於導入加法同形代理重加密協定之差分隱私 Peter Shaojui Wang 王紹睿 博士 國立臺灣大學 資訊工程學研究所 104 In this thesis, we consider a new insider threat for the privacy preserving work of distributed kernel-based data mining (DKBDM), such as distributed Support Vector Machine (SVM). Among several known data breaching problems, those associated with insider attacks have been rising significantly, making this one of the fastest growing types of security breaches. Once considered a negligible concern, insider attacks have risen to be one of the top three central data violations. Insider-related research involving the distribution of kernel-based data mining is limited, resulting in substantial vulnerabilities in designing protection against “collaborative organizations.” Prior works often fall short by addressing a multifactorial model that is more limited in scope and implementation than addressing “insiders within an organization” colluding with outsiders. A faulty system allows collusion to go unnoticed when an insider shares data with an outsider, who can then recover the original data from message transmissions (intermediary kernel values) among organizations. This attack requires only accessibility to a few data entries within the organizations rather than requiring the encrypted administrative privileges typically found in the distribution of data mining scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore this new insider threat in DKBDM. We also analytically demonstrate the minimum amount of insider data necessary to launch the insider attack. For countering the described attack, we then present two privacy-preserving methods to defend against the attack. For the first method, we reduce the number of insiders or expand the data dimensions to prevent the satisfaction of the privacy breach rule. For the second method, as differential privacy is one of the most theoretically sound and widespread privacy concepts, we will prove differential private method effective against the serious insider attack. Besides, Homomorphic Encryption method, which allows calculations on encrypted information to be performed without first decrypting the information, has been successfully used to solve the privacy issue of DKBDM in the past. However, this method is too time-consuming. Thus, we propose a Differentially-Private model based on Additive Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption for SVM (DAHOPE-SVM), which can drastically reduce the use of Homomorphic Encryption with the help of Proxy Re-Encryption and thus reduce the time required to perform. Our proposed method has been the quickest method of applying Homomorphic Encryption in DKBDM until now; at the same time, our method maintains a high standard of privacy protection by including a proven differential privacy component. Feipei Lai 賴飛羆 2016 學位論文 ; thesis 99 en_US
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description 博士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 資訊工程學研究所 === 104 === In this thesis, we consider a new insider threat for the privacy preserving work of distributed kernel-based data mining (DKBDM), such as distributed Support Vector Machine (SVM). Among several known data breaching problems, those associated with insider attacks have been rising significantly, making this one of the fastest growing types of security breaches. Once considered a negligible concern, insider attacks have risen to be one of the top three central data violations. Insider-related research involving the distribution of kernel-based data mining is limited, resulting in substantial vulnerabilities in designing protection against “collaborative organizations.” Prior works often fall short by addressing a multifactorial model that is more limited in scope and implementation than addressing “insiders within an organization” colluding with outsiders. A faulty system allows collusion to go unnoticed when an insider shares data with an outsider, who can then recover the original data from message transmissions (intermediary kernel values) among organizations. This attack requires only accessibility to a few data entries within the organizations rather than requiring the encrypted administrative privileges typically found in the distribution of data mining scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore this new insider threat in DKBDM. We also analytically demonstrate the minimum amount of insider data necessary to launch the insider attack. For countering the described attack, we then present two privacy-preserving methods to defend against the attack. For the first method, we reduce the number of insiders or expand the data dimensions to prevent the satisfaction of the privacy breach rule. For the second method, as differential privacy is one of the most theoretically sound and widespread privacy concepts, we will prove differential private method effective against the serious insider attack. Besides, Homomorphic Encryption method, which allows calculations on encrypted information to be performed without first decrypting the information, has been successfully used to solve the privacy issue of DKBDM in the past. However, this method is too time-consuming. Thus, we propose a Differentially-Private model based on Additive Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption for SVM (DAHOPE-SVM), which can drastically reduce the use of Homomorphic Encryption with the help of Proxy Re-Encryption and thus reduce the time required to perform. Our proposed method has been the quickest method of applying Homomorphic Encryption in DKBDM until now; at the same time, our method maintains a high standard of privacy protection by including a proven differential privacy component.
author2 Feipei Lai
author_facet Feipei Lai
Peter Shaojui Wang
王紹睿
author Peter Shaojui Wang
王紹睿
spellingShingle Peter Shaojui Wang
王紹睿
Design of a Privacy-Preserving Data Mining System Based on Differential Privacy Using Additive-Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol Against Insider Attacks
author_sort Peter Shaojui Wang
title Design of a Privacy-Preserving Data Mining System Based on Differential Privacy Using Additive-Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol Against Insider Attacks
title_short Design of a Privacy-Preserving Data Mining System Based on Differential Privacy Using Additive-Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol Against Insider Attacks
title_full Design of a Privacy-Preserving Data Mining System Based on Differential Privacy Using Additive-Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol Against Insider Attacks
title_fullStr Design of a Privacy-Preserving Data Mining System Based on Differential Privacy Using Additive-Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol Against Insider Attacks
title_full_unstemmed Design of a Privacy-Preserving Data Mining System Based on Differential Privacy Using Additive-Homomorphic Proxy Re-Encryption Protocol Against Insider Attacks
title_sort design of a privacy-preserving data mining system based on differential privacy using additive-homomorphic proxy re-encryption protocol against insider attacks
publishDate 2016
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63639699902141668295
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