Hold-up Problem and the Optimal Allocation of Control Right:From the Perspective of the Investor
碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 104 === The thesis analyzes the design of incomplete contract from the perspective of control right allocation to improve the efficiency of enterprise financing. It considers hold-up problems between manager and investor in enterprise financing from the standpoint of inv...
Main Authors: | GUANG CHEN, 陳光 |
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Other Authors: | Shul-John Li |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2016
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4jx246 |
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